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Abstract— This paper proposes multi-key encryption scheme and 
engine architecture (MKE) that increases security and optimizes 
energy efficiency of sensor networks, while minimizing 
modifications to existing implementations. The scheme improves 
security of AES against correlation power analysis (CPA) attack 
by employing MKE engine, breaking the correlation between 
power consumption and the used key. Other schemes utilize 
complex hardware designs, for example by using the 
inhomogeneous s-boxes that reduce energy efficiency of the 
engine. In contrast, the proposed hardware engine uses a 
randomly sequence of few keys to encode subsequent blocks of a 
messages. Additionally, the scheme improves security of AES 
against brute-force attacks for a given key size by utilizing 
multiple keys to encrypt subsequent blocks of a message. In 
contrast, a typical security upgrade would require a larger key 
size and encryption engine, which would increase cost and energy 
consumption of the devices. Both analytical and simulation 
results are presented in this paper. 
 
Keywords— Wireless sensor networks (WSN), Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), Correlation power Analysis (CPA), 
key pre-distribution. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The wireless sensor networks are increasingly employed in 
various applications, for example border security with sensors 
to detect intrusions, drinking water contamination detection 
around the water collection point. The secure communication 
in such networks becomes increasingly important. The system 
should prevent unauthorized access, tampering with the 
systems, and other malicious activities. However, the WSN 
poses several specific challenges related to security. First, a 
typical WSN consists of hundreds or thousands of battery-
powered sensing devices. Hence, the sensor mote’s cost and 
energy consumption have to be minimized in order to make 
the WSNs viable for commercial applications. Second, the 
limited processing capabilities prevent from utilizing complex 
and computationally intensive encryption algorithms. 
However, the required security level increases over time with 
the computational power available to attackers. Consequently, 
the ever-improving processor’s speed and capabilities force 
the sensor designer to increase the size of encryption key thus 
increasing cost and energy consumption of the devices. Hence, 
a simple increase of key size is not suitable to handle the 
tradeoff between the security, energy efficiency, and cost 
requires a different approach than a simple increase of the key 
size. 
In contrast, the proposed scheme employs multiple keys to 
improve the overall security. The proposed scheme uses these 
keys in a random sequence to encrypt a particular message. 
Hence, if attacker discovers a single key then only a fraction 
of the message is compromised. Consequently, all the keys 
have to be compromised before the link becomes unsecure. 
Moreover, the order and the id of the particular key used are 
hidden from attacker since the keys are selected randomly and 
switched on a block-by-block basis instead of per packet or 
per link basis. The proposed scheme can be applied in any 
communication network with AES as encryption algorithm, to 
improve security against CPA attacks. However, it is 
especially suitable to memory constrained, energy-limited 
wireless sensor networks. 
A. Background and Related Work 
The proposed scheme aims at thwarting different attacks 
on AES algorithm while minimizing necessary changes to the 
encryption engine implementation. The scheme should be 
used in conjunction with a key distribution scheme that 
provides the nodes with sufficient number of keys. Many 
distribution algorithms [1][2] have been developed and can be 
used with the proposed scheme, for example Eschenauer and 
Gligor [3] have developed random key pre-distribution 
protocols in which a random subset of keys from a large pool 
of symmetric keys is loaded to each node have to find one 
common key from their subsets which will be used as shared 
secret key for protecting their communication. The 
Eschenauer-Gligor scheme has been progressively improved 
[4][5][6]. For example, Du et al. [5] proposed the DDHV (Du, 
Deng, Han, and Varshney) scheme. The DDHV scheme is 
based on a multiple key space scheme generated from Blom’s 
[7] λ-secure symmetric key generation system, which is 
randomly assigned to each sensor node in the network. 
Schemes using random distribution of keys are proposed with 
different approach techniques to distribute keys among nodes 
based on different metrics like security, memory, and energy-
efficiency. Also, similar mechanisms have been proposed for 
heterogeneous WSNs [8][9]. 
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 In general, sensor nodes will either have to be powered by 
small nonrenewable batteries or use a modest amount of 
energy harvested from the environment, for example from 
solar panel. However, the amount of available energy in both 
approaches is limited thus thwarting node operational 
capabilities. Hence, developing energy-efficient cryptographic 
algorithms and methods is a critical issue in designing 
protocols for wireless sensor networks, including the security 
schemes. The sensors’ resource constraints, coupled with their 
limited knowledge of the topology within which they are 
deployed, render public-key-infrastructure-(PKI) based 
schemes inappropriate for wireless sensor networks. Some 
existing studies suggest storing the master key in tamper-
resistant memory to reduce the risk [10] [11]. However, there 
exist attacks that do not require direct access to the memory 
with the secret key. For example, CPA attack exploits 
knowledge of hardware implementation of AES to determine a 
key value using energy signatures. 
Power analysis attacks pose a serious threat to 
implementations of cryptographic algorithms since the 
attacker does not have to gain access to protected memory. A 
practical power analysis attack method has been demonstrated 
[12] [13]. There exist strategies to protect a device against 
such an attack, for example by masking the intermediate 
results [14]. However, the existing approaches often require 
significant modification to the encryption engines [15] and 
increase energy consumption [16]. For example, a set of 
different, energy-suboptimal S-Box implementations can be 
used to hide the key at the cost of higher energy consumption 
[16]. In contrast, the proposed scheme allows selecting the 
most energy efficient AES implementation while 
counteracting CPA attacks by rotating available keys. Each 
key has a different energy signature, thus breaking correlation 
between energy consumption and a key value. Hence, the 
proposed scheme ensures the CPA attacks fails. 
This paper presents analysis of the security improvements 
of the proposed multi-key encryption scheme using the AES 
cipher. The AES is a symmetric block cipher standard, which 
was issued by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in 2001 [17]. However, it has to be noted 
that the proposed scheme does not dependent on a specific 
cipher since the theoretical analysis does not assume usage of 
AES. Existing multi–key schemes aim at improving the 
security against the brute force attack by increasing the 
effective key length. For example the Triple-DES [18] uses 
the three keys on each block of data subsequently. In contrast, 
the proposed scheme counters both the CPA and brute force 
attacks by using a randomly selected key for each block. 
Consequently, the attacker does not have information which 
key was used to encrypt the particular block. 
The proposed scheme increases the security of AES 
algorithm with minimal modifications to the hardware design 
and without any changes to the AES methodology. It is 
assumed that the keys are available at the sensor nodes. An 
existing key management schemes [1][2][3][4][5][6][7] can be 
utilized to satisfy that assumption. 
Remark: The dynamic key distribution schemes 
contribute to communication and power overhead of the whole 
network. Hence, the future work will include an extended 
performance analysis of the proposed scheme including the 
impact of a key management scheme. However, for clarity this 
work focuses on the analysis of the security aspects of the 
proposed scheme.  
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) novel AES 
engine architecture that can utilize multiple keys to increase 
security, (2) theoretical analysis of the performance of the 
proposed scheme, and (3) a simple and energy-efficient 
hardware model for implementing the proposed scheme. The 
paper is organized as follows: in Section II, the main types of 
attacks on AES algorithm are discussed. Next, the proposed 
multiple-key encryption technique is presented in Section III. 
In Section IV, the theoretical analysis of proposed technique is 
given. Finally, the simulation results for power correlation 
attack are presented in Section V. 
II. SECURITY ATTACKS 
In this paper, the performance analysis is conducted with 
regards to two types of attacks: (a) the CPA and (b) the brute-
force attack on AES scheme. First the details of the attack 
technique are given, in order to gain understanding how the 
proposed scheme improves the security. 
A. Correlation Power Analysis Attack 
The CPA attack exploits the correlation between energy 
consumption of the circuit and the data processed on it. Often, 
it is assumed that the circuit’s power consumption varies 
linearly with the bit-wise difference in the processed data 
[12][13]. For example, if a register bit changes value, the 
energy consumed is different than if the bit value does not 
change. For the particular S-Box design, the attacker can 
analyze correlation between power signatures and the pair of a 
plain text and a key. When the encryption is repeated for a 
sufficient number of plaintexts the statistical correlation with 
simulated keys can be calculated. The key with the highest 
correlation is considered to be the secret key. Moreover, this 
method is noninvasive since the attacker does no need to 
access and read the memory with the key, which often is 
protected [10][11]. 
Next, the analysis of CPA attack is performed for the 
partial key Ks for simplicity. However, the results are valid for 
the retrieval of the whole key since the method can be 
repeated to retrieve the other partial keys. For AES, the CPA 
attacker analyses power signatures for the first and last round 
of the encryption process. For the CPA attack, a predictable 
power consumption model is considered:  
ௌܹሺ݆ሻ ൌ W൫ܭௌ, PTሺ݆ሻ൯ (1) 
where WS(j) is the power consumption for plaintext j, KS is a 
partial key, PT(j) is the jth random plaintext, and W is a 
function of power dissipation. Given N plaintexts, the 
predicted power WS(j) can be derived using (1), and the 
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 corresponding power traces calculated. In general, the CPA 
assumes that power consumption is proportional to number of 
bits changed in S-Box register. In other words, the power is 
proportional to Hamming distance [21]. To simplify the 
analysis while not losing generality, it is assumed that the 
register, R is initialized to zero (0). Consequently, the power 
consumed can be expressed as  
 (2) 
where a is a scalar gain between the Hamming distance, H, 
and the power consumed, W. The current and previous states 
of the S-Box register are expressed as D and R respectively, b 
is power dissipation induced by noise offsets, and time 
dependent components in a 128-bit random key. If D contains 
m independent and uniformly distributed bits, the whole word 
has an average hamming weight μ=m/2 and a variance 
σ2=m/4. Hence, the correlation coefficient between W and 
H(D) is equal to: 
 (3) 
When a partial key guess, Ks, is considered then  
 (4) 
where PTs denotes the corresponding partial plaintexts. If PTs 
contains n independent and uniformly distributed bits, it has 
an average μ=n/2 and a variance σ2=n/4. Consequently, the 
correlation between W and P is expressed as: 
 (5) 
According to above discussion, the partial key guess is correct, 
if the intermediate results and the power consumption are 
correlated, that is the highest correlation coefficient is 
achieved for that key. 
B. Brute Force Attack 
The brute force attack is a simple type of attack though 
requires relatively large effort. The attacker decrypts the 
cipher text trying every possible key. Assuming the attacker 
can identify if the decrypted value is the correct ones, the 
technique requires on average to decrypt half of the total 
number of possible keys. Hence, for a sufficiently long key the 
brute force attack becomes impractical. However, the ever-
improving performance of modern processing systems quickly 
ages and weakens the security of AES for a given key size, as 
shown in Table 1. Simple remedy is to increase key size in par 
with technical capabilities of a potential attacker. However, in 
case of resource limited sensor nodes the added memory, 
processing, and power requirements become prohibitive. 
Current practice is to use a 128-bit AES key. Hence, the 
total number of different keys is equal to 3.4 x 1038. Table 1 
illustrates how long it takes to break the AES key using brute 
force attack. The current results are contrasted with the results 
from 1995. Additionally, Table 2 shows the decrease in 
hardware costs per 1000 (millions instructions per second) 
MIPS [19][20]. Hence, it can be inferred that the security of 
the AES decreases with time for the same key size.  
In conclusion, a simple remedy of increasing key size 
might increase security against brute-force attacks but for 
WSNs due to resource limitations in terms of memory, battery 
power a different approach is needed. The proposed scheme 
modified architecture of the encryption engine to utilize 
multiple shorter keys. The security of the proposed scheme 
increases without need for larger encryption engines. The 
analytical results are presented in Subsection IV.B. 
TABLE 1. COST AND TIME ESTIMATION FOR A BRUTE FORCE 
ATTACK 
Machine cost Key Search Time in 
2009 
Key Search Time in 
1995 
$300M 9.37 x 1015 years 4.52 x 1023 years 
$300K 6.52 x 1024 years 5.6 x 1033 years 
$10K 7.42 x 1036 years Infeasible 
TABLE 2. HARDWARE COST OF PROCESSING POWER 
Corresponding year Hardware cost/1000MIPS
1961 $1.1 trillion 
1997 $30,000 
2007 $0.42 
III. MULTI-KEY ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUE 
The proposed encryption scheme utilizes multiple keys to 
encrypt plaintext using AES algorithm. The subsequent blocks 
of plain text are encrypted using randomly selected keys. In 
contrast, the standard AES uses a single key to encrypt the 
whole plaintext. The proposed scheme increases security when 
compared with the single key approach since complete 
decryption can be done only with all utilized keys.  
Remark: Though the proposed scheme provides uniform 
security to all data, it is possible to vary the security level (e.g. 
number of used keys) based on requested protection. In such 
cases, MKE scheme can be adjusted to use more number of 
keys for high priority data and fewer keys for low priority 
data. Also, the routing may vary with requested protection 
level in order to avoid links with too few keys.  
The improved security is achieved with minimal 
modifications to the AES engine and small increase of 
complexity and energy. Moreover, the message content is 
protected even if the intruder compromises few of the shared 
keys since part of the message will be still protected with the 
rest of keys. The detailed analysis is presented in Section IV. 
The packet is encrypted such that only the destination node 
can decrypt the data with the corresponding shared keys. The 
original message is pre-pended with two fields: the first key 
W = a ⋅ H (D) + b ⋅ D
ρwH =
E(H (D)W )− E(H (D))E(W)
σ (H(D))σ (W ) =
a m
ma2 + 4σ b
2
P = PT S ⊕ K S
ρwH =
E(H (P)W )− E(H (P))E(W)
σ (H (P))σ (W ) =
a n
na2 + 4σ b
2
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 ID and a seed, as shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Figure 1. Data payload of a packet 
A. Synchronization of Radom Key Sequences 
The Key ID and seed fields are utilized for the 
synchronization purposes. When the destination receives the 
message it needs to first synchronize the pseudo random 
generator with the source in order to discover the appropriate 
sequence of keys. Hence, the first block of the message is 
decrypted using each shared key until the correct key is found, 
that is when the message’s key ID matches the one of the 
applied key.  
When the right key is found for the first block the 
subsequent blocks are decrypted only once using the correct 
sequence of keys selected by the pseudo random generator. 
Also, the same random generator is applied for the subsequent 
messages in order to reduce the overhead of trying all the 
shared keys for the first block of every message.  
Moreover, the loss of synchronization between transmitter 
and receiver, for example due to lost packets and 
retransmission, can easily be detected. The receiver node 
compares ‘key id’ and ‘seed’ fields from each message with 
the random generator sequence. The match confirms a 
successful synchronization and the rest of message can be 
decrypted. Otherwise, the synchronization procedure is 
repeated using the first block, as described above. 
 
Figure 2. Encryption Module 
The encryption process of the proposed MKE scheme is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. The plaintext data blocks (e.g. 128, 156 or 
192 bits long) are encrypted with the key chosen by the 
pseudo-random key selector module. The first encrypted block 
includes the key id and random generator’s seed that are 
necessary to recreate the same key sequence at both 
transmitter and receiver. Moreover, these values are selected 
randomly and never transmitted in plain. Hence, the attacker 
is unable to acquire them. 
Decryption process is shown in Fig. 3. Note that an 
additional processing overhead is introduced when decrypting 
the first block since the correct key has to be found. Once the 
first block is decrypted the subsequent blocks are decrypted 
using keys dictated by the pseudo-random generator. 
Moreover, in order to minimize the initial overhead, the 
encoding of the subsequent packets can continue using the 
same pseudo-random sequence. Then the decoder when using 
the same sequence will start the key search using the correct 
one. Hence, no processing overhead will be incurred. 
 
Figure 3. Decryption Module 
The existing approaches require significant modification to 
the encryption engines [16], or use less energy efficient 
designs [15]. In contrast, the proposed scheme can utilize the 
S-Boxes with the lowest power consumption that increases 
energy-efficiency when compared to other schemes [15][16]. 
Moreover, the security is increased for the same key and 
cipher size. Next, the analytical and simulation results are 
presented.  
IV. THEORETICAL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED 
MKE SCHEME 
The security of the proposed multi-key encryption (MKE) 
scheme is analyzed against the CPA attack and also the brute-
force attack. The quantitative results and improvements are 
presented in next subsections. 
A. CPA Attack 
Assume that CPA attack on 8 MSBs (Most Significant Bit) 
of the registers shown in Fig. 4. The key used for this 
operation is the original key for encryption, N random 
plaintexts and one fixed but random key have been chosen for 
the experiment, the total number of bit-changes between the 
previous and the current values of these M MSBs of the 
register for the initial key addition are calculated. 
940
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Figure 4: Simplified diagram of AES algorithm 
 
By employing the proposed MKE scheme the correlation 
between power values with respect to cipher key is broken and 
correlation coefficients values are reduced. The proposed 
engine architecture is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. If an attacker 
employs the CPA method to compromise the secret key, the 
exact key cannot be decoded since the correlation between the 
power and the secret key is broken. 
Let us consider scenario where two keys are used. Their 
partial keys are ks1 and ks2 respectively. Then corresponding 




Figure 5. Modified Architecture for AES Encryption 
Algorithm 
 
Figure 6. Modified Architecture for AES Encryption 
The correlation can be calculated from (5). When the 
attacker encrypts N plaintexts, it can calculate correlation 
between the corresponding power usage for each plaintext and 
the simulated power consumption of the same plaintexts. The 
attacker needs to calculate the correlation for every key 
combination. For a particular key the correlation values are 
summed up for all plaintexts: 
 (7) 
where p1,p2,…,pN denote the keys used with each plaintexts. 
Theorem 1: The correlation factor value decreases with 
number of employed keys. 
Proof: The claim of the Theorem 1 is analyzed for two 
cases: with two and M keys. In short, the combined correlation 
factor obtained for multiple keys is smaller compared to the 
correlation factor obtained when employing one key over N 
plaintexts. 
1) Case 1: Encryption using two keys 
First, a case with two keys used for encryption is 
considered. The keys are randomly used to encrypt N 
subsequent message blocks. Let nk1 and nk2 denotes the 
number of blocks encrypted with the key k1 and k2 
respectively. Now the correlation factor is equal to 
 (8) 
where ρwp1 and ρwp2  are the correlation factors corresponding 
to keys k1 and k2. The difference in correlation factor value 
due to implementation of multiple keys can be expressed as: 
P1 = PTS ⊕ K S1
P2 = PTS ⊕ K S 2
wpwpNwpwpk N ρρρρρ ⋅≅+++= ...21
ρk = nK1 ⋅ρwp1 +nK2 ⋅ρwp2 = nK1 ⋅ρwp1 +(N −nK1)⋅ρwp2
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  (9) 
where N > nk1 , and Δρk  is the difference between correlation 
factors when single key and multiple keys are used. If the 
difference factor is positive, then correlation factors get altered 
such that exact key used cannot be found.  
For example, in Fig. 7, the key at I=156 has the highest 
correlation coefficient ρwp1  averaged over N rounds. If a 
different key is used for encryption and averaged over N 
rounds the correlation for I=156, denoted as ρwp2 , is always 
lesser than the ρwp1  from the first encryption instance since 
second key will have its peak at other time instance. So, using 
both keys subsequently decreases the overall correlation 
coefficient value for N rounds.  
Overall, the following conditions hold: N > nk1  and 
ρwp1 > ρwp 2. Consequently, the first difference of correlation 
factor Δρk  is always positive which shows that the final 
correlation values decrease if two keys are used. 
2) Case 2: General formulation for M keys 
Following the analysis from the case 1, the correlation 
factor difference for M keys can be expressed as: 
 (10) 
where N = nkii=1
M
 . The ρwp1  is the highest correlation when 
compared to the other M-1 keys. Hence, the Δρk  difference is 
always positive.  
B. Brute Force Attack 
The proposed scheme uses random sequence of N keys to 
encrypt block plaintext using AES algorithm. Hence, if k keys 
out of N are compromised, the attacker does have to have 
sufficient information to determine the sequence used to 
encrypt the message blocks. In this technique the keys are 
selected randomly and attacker uses every key out of the 
known k keys to decrypt the cipher text for every cipher text 
block. The number of trials increases with number of blocks in 
the message and number of known keys, k. Moreover, only a 
fraction of a message is decrypted, as he knows only few out 
of total number of keys. 
In order to find the correct 128-bit key the attacker needs 
to consider all 2128 possible keys. In terms of probability the 
probability of selecting a correct key is equal to . The 
probability of finding the particular key by brute force, P(T), 
can be expressed as 
 (11) 
In the MKE scheme, each block is encrypted using 
randomly selected key out of the N shared ones. Hence, even 
if intruder compromises few keys, it is not possible to decode 
whole message until every key used for encryption is 
compromised. 
Consider an attacker who compromised k out of N keys. 
Now, the attacker has to select a key each time from the group 
of known k keys for every cipher text block, then the 
probability of selection a key is 
  (12) 
Probability of finding exact key from known k keys out of 
N keys until correct key is found is given as: 
  (13) 
where L denotes the number of trials to be performed for each 
message block to decrypt it until attacker finds the correct key 
from the known group of keys and it has a maximum value of 
k (i.e., total number of keys known by the intruder). 
The final probability becomes lower than P(T) in (11), 
where only one key is used. The final probability Pfinal , is the 
product of P(k) and Pcorrect  and is given by 
Pfinal = P (k) ⋅ Pcorrect  (14) 
 where Pfinal  denotes final probability of finding the correct 
key for each plaintext block and it denotes increase in security, 
even if some of the keys out of k keys are compromised 
attacker has to check each time for the correctness of the key, 
which results in time consumption as well as only partial 
detection of the whole message. 
Remark: It has to be noted that the proper design of the 
random generator (RNG) is required to ensure that attacker 
cannot finding the order of the keys and thus predict which 
one is used for each block. A weak RNGs are known to 
undermine otherwise strong security mechanisms [22] [23]. 
The percentage of total message decrypted is proportional 
to number of k keys known to intruder out of N keys 
 (15) 
The proposed scheme increases the security by using 
multiple-keys. The security increases proportionally to the 
number of used keys. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Simulation has been conducted in Matlab to analyze the 
performance of the proposed MKE schemes in thwarting the 
CPA attack. Attack on a partial 8-bit key is studied. However, 
the results can be easily expanded to the general case of L-bit 
key. It is assumed that the attacker simulates encryption 
engine for the g=256 keys (for 8-bit partial key/register). The 
attacker collects the power signatures for N=1000 plaintexts, 
Δρk = N ⋅ ρwp1 − nk1 ⋅ ρwp1 + (N − nk1 ) ⋅ ρwp2[ ]
Δρk = N ⋅ ρwp1 − nk1 ⋅ ρwp1 + nk2 ⋅ ρwp2 + ... + nkM ⋅ ρwpM[ ]
P = 2−128
P(T ) = (1− P)T P
Pcorrect = (1− P (k))L












⎠ ⎟ =   (k N)
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 each plaintext representing a block of message data. Then, the 
correlation factors for (N x g) cases are calculated and 
averaged for the N=1000 plaintexts. The results are presented 
based on reference to the respective keys. The key with 
highest correlation is expected to be the secret key used for the 
actual encryption. The proposed technique uses multiple keys 
subsequently for N plaintexts, which results in the reduced 
correlation. 
Remark: In CPA attack, the complexity of attack 
increases with number of plaintexts, N. Also, the confidence 
of finding the correct key increases with number of plaintexts, 
N, since the individual correlation coefficients of N plaintexts 
are being summed up. However, the confidence saturates at 
some level due to noise in measurements and quality of the 
power correlation for the given circuitry. Furthermore, in case 
of the MKE scheme, the signal correlation reduces when 
compared to a single key scheme since the random selection 
of keys breaks the correlation between power consumption 
and the key. This tradeoff between increasing complexity and 
saturating confidence leads to a practically justifiable size of 
the plaintext set, N. Henceforth, the N=1000 value is  typically 
considered for this experiment[15][16].  
Fig. 7 illustrates the raw correlation factors for a single key 
scenario [16]. It exhibits a high correlation with the secret key 
that was used during the actual encryption. In contrast, for 
MKE scheme the correlation between secret key and 
correlation coefficients decrease with number of used keys, as 
shown in Figs. 8 and 9. The main reason is that the subsequent 
blocks are encrypted with different keys, which power 
correlation with the simulated results for a single key 
decreases. 
 
Figure 7. The correlation coefficients for one key [17]  
 
Figure 8. The correlation coefficients when two keys are used 
 
Figure 9. The correlation coefficients when five keys are used 
For the two key case, as shown in Fig. 8, the highest 
correlation occurs for I=256. This is different from single-key 
case presented in Fig. 7 since the MKE technique randomly 
select keys that reduces overall correlation factor averaged 
over N blocks of data. In this case, two keys are randomly 
chosen to encrypt N=1000 plaintexts or blocks of data. 
Assuming that attacker have no idea of MKE scheme, 
correlates N*g cases (g=256) for each of the g keys with 
power consumption values of N=1000 plaintexts (uses two 
keys for encryption). It results in lower correlation values with 
only one of the key among the two having the highest 
correlation (one key match with original key in ‘g’ keys and 
other key negating). Moreover, the equation (10) can be 
interpreted as an average of the correlations of the used keys. 
Hence, the overall correlation reduces with the number of used 
keys since the average over the whole domain space is equal 
to zero. Next, the proposed scheme is analyzed from energy-
efficiency point of view. 
A. Energy Efficiency Analysis 
The energy efficiency is measured as the energy consumed 
by encryption engine to transmit a given message. The 
analysis assumes the AES-based engine that operates on 128-
bit blocks (128-bit key size). In general, the AES algorithm 
can be implemented using various S-Box designs, for example 
LUT, SOP, etc. These S-boxes have different energy 
efficiency and power correlation. In the scheme proposed in 
[16] the authors utilize a combination of several different 
designs in order to reduce power correlation. However, the 
power consumption increases since the scheme uses S-boxes 
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 with a high-energy consumption. 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of power consumption for multi-key 
encryption (MKE) scheme  
In contrast, the proposed MKE scheme improves the 
energy-efficiency compared to the technique in [16] since it 
can employ the S-box design with lowest power consumption, 
as shown in Fig. 10. The comparison between power 
consumption of the technique in [16] and the proposed scheme 
illustrates that even with the initial synchronization overhead 
(i.e. finding the first key in sequence) the proposed scheme 
outperforms the other scheme. Moreover, the proposed 
scheme scales better with size of the message since it allows 
using the S-boxes with the lowest power footprint. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The proposed MKE technique has been shown to improve 
the security of AES algorithm against CPA attack while 
minimizing power consumption. Additionally, it improves 
security of AES against brute-force attacks.  
In the case of a CPS attach, the MKE scheme thwarts a 
CPA type attack by reducing correlation between power 
consumption and the key. The proposed scheme, using 5 keys 
can decrease the correlation by 80% between power and data. 
Also, the energy consumption of the proposed MKE scheme 
reduces by over 70% when compared to the inhomogeneous 
S-boxes scheme while maintaining high security. 
Moreover, when a single key is compromised only a small 
fraction of the message is compromised thus increasing 
security against brute-force attacks. Consequently, all the keys 
have to be compromised before the link becomes unsecure. 
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